






Abstract: My paper offers a new interpretation of Reid’s account of social oper-
ations of the human mind. I argue that it is important to acknowledge the coun-
terpart structure of social operations. By this I mean that for Reid every social
operation is paired with a counterpart operation. On the view that I ascribe to
Reid, at least two intelligent beings take part in a social operation and the social
operation does not come into existence until both the social operation and its
counterpart operation have been exercised and the relevant mental thoughts
made known to the other being by words or signs.
1. Introduction
My main topic in this paper is Thomas Reid’s account of social operations
of the human mind.1 Reid argues that all operations of the human mind
can be divided into social and solitary and that this distinction ‘has a real
foundation in nature’ (EIP, I.8, p. 68). Yet what are social operations of
the mind and how doesReid distinguish them from solitary ones? According
to Reid, social operations ‘necessarily imply social intercourse with some
other intelligent being who bears a part in them’ (EAP, V.6, p. 330). Exam-
ples include asking a question, testifying a fact, giving a command, or mak-
ing a promise. Social operations must be ‘expressed by words or signs, and
known to the other party’ (EAP, V.6, p. 330). Solitary operations, by con-
trast, ‘may be performed by a man in solitude, without intercourse with
any other intelligent being’ (EAP, V.6, p. 330). For instance, seeing, hearing,
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remembering, judging, or reasoning do not presuppose the presence or exis-
tence of another intelligent being, nor do they need to be expressed.
It is worth noting that although social operations are significant in Reid’s
philosophy for explaining why humans are social creatures, he does not re-
strict human sociability to social operations. Rather Reid acknowledges that
in addition to social operations there are social affections and both play an
important role in our social lives.2 Reid sometimes also calls social opera-
tions ‘social intellectual powers’ (EIP, I.8, p. 69) or ‘social intellectual oper-
ations’ (EIP, I.8, p. 69) to distinguish them from social affections. Social
operations and social affections have in common that ‘both suppose a con-
viction of the existence of other intelligent beings’ (EIP, I.8, p. 69). Accord-
ing to Reid, affections are directed towards persons ‘and imply, in their very
nature, our being well or ill affected to some person, or, at least, to some an-
imated being’ (EAP, III.ii.3, p. 107). Affections do not require a reaction
from the person to whom they are directed. As I will explain in more detail
in the following, social operations, by contrast, require such a reaction.
For the rest of the paper, Reid’s account of social operations will be my
main focus. Current Reid scholarship has not paid much attention to it,
and I believe that the few existing interpretations can be improved.3 This is
my main aim in this paper. In my view, Reid scholars have not given suffi-
cient consideration to the counterpart structure of social operations. The
view that I defend in the following draws attention to the fact that for Reid
social operations come in pairs. Each social operation is paired with a coun-
terpart operation. For instance, promising is paired with accepting a prom-
ise, commanding with obeying, asking a question with answering, or
testifying with testimonial belief. My view is that a promise does not come
into existence until the promisorA has expressed a promise to another intel-
ligent being, the promisee B, and B has agreed to accept the promise and
made this known to A. By agreeing to accept the promise B exercises the
counterpart operation to promising. By the same token, the other social op-
erations do not come into existence until they have been expressed and the
other intelligent being who takes part in it has understood it and reacted
to it by exercising the counterpart operation and expressing their reaction.
This counterpart structure of Reid’s social operations has been widely
neglected, but I believe that it is central for properly understanding Reid’s
thinking about social operations.
In the following, I pay close attention to Reid’s understanding of prom-
ises. There are two reasons for this. First, it is helpful to focus on a specific
social operation. As we will see, many of the considerations that apply to
promises apply also to other social operations more generally. Second,
Reid’s account of promises inEssays on the Active Powers ofMan is directed
against David Hume’s view that fidelity to promises is an artificial virtue.4
Reid criticizes Hume for reducing virtues to solitary acts of mind and for
failing to realize that in addition to solitary acts of minds, there are social
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acts of mind. Thus, focusing on promises will not only shed light on Reid’s
thinking about promises but also illuminate how he attempts to overcome
problems that he identifies for Hume’s philosophy.
My paper proceeds as follows. I begin by asking in what sense social op-
erations are ‘social’ (Section 2). I approach this question by examining the
different components of social operations. I then further clarify my interpre-
tation, outline its implications, and address potential objections (Section 3).
Next, I show how my interpretation avoids problems that arise for Rebecca
Copenhaver’s interpretation (Section 4) and how it advancesGideonYaffe’s
interpretation (Section 5). Neither Copenhaver nor Yaffe pay proper atten-
tion to the counterpart structure of social operations. I end by considering
whether Reid’s criticism of Hume’s view that fidelity to promises is an arti-
ficial virtue is fair and assess possible responses that could be made on
Hume’s behalf (Section 6).
2. In what sense are social operations ‘social’?
I now turn to the question in what sense social operations are ‘social’. Before
addressing this question, it is helpful to turn for a moment to solitary
operations and their constituent elements. In Essays on the Intellectual
Powers of Man, Reid distinguishes the content of a mental operation – or
‘object’ as he calls it – from the mental act itself and the subject of the mental
operation.5 For instance, let us consider the sentence ‘I perceive a lemon
tree’. In this case, I stands for the subject, namely, a person or mind, the
active verb perceive denotes the mental act of perceiving, and the object of
this mental operation is a lemon tree. If we follow Reid in distinguishing
the constituents of mental operations in this way, it becomes possible to
account for the difference between various types of mental operations
such as perception, memory, or imagination. Although all these mental
operations can have a lemon tree as their object, Reid would argue that per-
ceiving, remembering, and imagining are three different mental activities.6
With regard to perception, Reid claims that the object of perception must
be something present, while the object of memory must be something past.7
Moreover, he argues that perception differs from imagination, insofar as in
the case of perception the subject has a belief or ‘full conviction’ that the
things perceived exist, while there is no such belief if one is imagining.8 Reid
further notes that the object of perception must be something external.
Otherwise if the object is something internal and present, he maintains, it
is the object of consciousness rather than perception.9
On this basis, let us turn to social operations. Social operations differ from
solitary operations insofar as at least two intelligent beings take part in them,
while solitary operations have one subject. Moreover, Reid makes clear that
every social operation, in contrast to solitary operations, must be expressed
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by words or signs.10 This has led some interpreters to propose that social op-
erations are speech acts for Reid.11 The difficulty with this proposal is that it
cannot easily make sense of Reid’s view that social operations are mental
acts.12 Rather than identifying social operations with speech acts, I believe
that we should take him at his word and acknowledge that social operations
are mental acts, which are always accompanied by an act of expression.13
On this view, the mental act, say the mental act of promising, is a distinct
act from the act of expression, namely, the utterance ‘I promise you to φ’.
Taking these differences between solitary and social operations into ac-
count, social operations can be said to have the following constituents: First,
two or more intelligent beings must take part in the operation. Second, a so-
cial operation must have a particular content, which Reid would call its ob-
ject. For instance, making a promise involves promising something, or
giving testimony involves testifying something. Third, a social operation in-
volves a mental act and additionally an accompanying act of expression.
Now that we have identified these different constituents of social operations
provides more fine-grained resources for examining in what sense social op-
erations are social. I propose that when asking in what sense social opera-
tions are social, we should ask which of the constituents, namely, the
presence of two (or more) intelligent beings, the object (or content), the men-
tal act, and/or the act of expression, make the operation social.
For present purposes, it will be sufficient to focus on promises. Like every
social operation, promises presuppose the existence of at least two intelligent
beings, namely, a promisorA and a promisee B. Making a promise involves
promising something φ. If A promises B to φ, sayA promises B not to drink
in the evening, then the promise cannot be social purely in virtue of its con-
tent, or ‘object’ asReidwould say, becauseA can take othermental attitudes
towards the same content, which are solitary acts of mind. For instance, A
can believe that they will not drink, A can desire not to drink, or A can be
disappointed that they will not drink.14 Therefore, it is more plausible that
promises are social in virtue of the presence of two intelligent beings,
namely, the promisorA and the promiseeB, and/or the mental act of prom-
ising accompanied by the act of expression.
The presence of another intelligent being is not sufficient to make an op-
eration social. For instance, assume that I ask a friend to help me carry fur-
niture on a moving truck. Although I would have struggled to carry the
furniture myself, the act of carrying furniture is not a social act, because a
strong person is able to do it alone without help of others.15 Thus, the mere
fact that two or more intelligent beings take part in an action does not make
the operation social.
Yet Reid is explicit that social operations ‘necessarily imply social inter-
course with some other intelligent being who bears part in them’ (EAP,
V.6, p. 330). This intimates that he regards only those operations as social
that necessarily require another intelligent being who participates in the
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act.16 Let us assume that I play chess with a friend. Would Reid regard the
act of playing chess as a social operation?Although playing chess commonly
involves two intelligent beings, it does not necessarily do so, because I could
also play with a computer.17 According to Reid, social operations ‘suppose
understanding and will’ (EIP, I.8, p. 68). A computer lacks active power
and, thus, lacks a will. Therefore, a computer is not capable of engaging in
social operations.18 It follows that playing chess is not a social operation
in Reid’s sense. Yaffe – and I am in agreement with him on this issue – puts
the general point well by stating that in order for a mental operation to be
social, ‘it must imply the existence of other beings who are intelligent and
who are exercising their intelligence’ (Yaffe, 2007, p. 282).
Despite the importance of the presence of another intelligent being who
exercises their intelligence, I believe that an interpretation of Reid’s account
of social operations remains incomplete without additionally examining
whether the relevant mental acts and the accompanying acts of expression,
such as the mental act of promising and the utterance ‘I promise you to φ’,
play a role in making the operation social. This question has not received
sufficient attention in current Reid scholarship.19 I want to propose that an-
other intelligent being takes part in a social operation not merely by being
present but by reacting to the act of expression and making their response
known.More precisely, as Reid states in the following passages, if intelligent
being A utters ‘I promise you to φ’, directed at another intelligent being B, it
is important that B understands the act of expression and reacts to it by
accepting (or not accepting) what is promised and making this response
known to A.
It is obvious that the prestation promisedmust be understood by both parties. One party engages
to do such a thing, another accepts of this engagement. An engagement to do, one does not know
what, can neither bemade nor accepted. It is no less obvious, that a contract is a voluntary trans-
action. (EAP, V.6, p. 336)
Whatmakes a promise is, that it be expressed to the other party with understanding, and with an
intention to become bound, and that it be accepted by him. (EAP, V.6, p. 342)
These passages intimate that the mental acts and their accompanying acts
of expression, which are involved in social operations, come in pairs. The
proposal is that the mental act of promising is paired with the mental act
of accepting the promised thing. This same structure extends to other social
operations. For instance, asking a question is paired with responding, com-
manding with obeying,20 and testifying with testimonial belief.
It is worth examining more closely how Reid understands the pairing or
counterpart structure of social mental acts. First, Reid accepts that we can
engage in social operations because we have been equipped with original
faculties21 that enable us to engage in social acts such as promising,
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testifying, asking a question, or commanding.22 Reid believes that these so-
cial acts arise from simple faculties and that they cannot be reduced to other
mental acts. In this respect, social acts are on par with solitary mental acts
such as perceiving or remembering, which are also irreducible to other men-
tal acts. On a weak dispositional reading, Reidmay be said to accept that all
human beings are equipped with the relevant faculties that enable them to
engage in social operations. In particular, it can be said that humans are al-
ways equipped with both the faculty to engage in a certain social act and its
counterpart faculty, which enables them to react to the social act. For in-
stance, this means that humans not only can make promises but also can ac-
cept them. A defender of the weak dispositional reading can argue that
Reid’s view does not require that the other intelligent being towards whom
a social operation is directed always reacts to it by exercising the counterpart
act, but rather it is sufficient that both intelligent beings are equipped with
the relevant faculties, which enable them to engage in social operations
and to react to them. However, does this weak reading accurately capture
Reid’s view?
Based on the passages cited earlier, I take it that Reid endorses a stronger
view. As stated earlier, a promise must not only be expressed but also ac-
cepted by the other party.More generally, if intelligent beingA initiates a so-
cial operation by making an act of expression directed at another intelligent
being B, Reid holds – so I argue – that B has to react to it in each instance
and make their reaction known to A to make the operation a social opera-
tion. Two clarifications are worth adding. First, Reid accepts thatB can vol-
untarily decide how to react. Second, he further acknowledges that
expression can take a variety of forms and can sometimes involve silence.
Let me elaborate on each of these issues in turn.
On the interpretation that I am proposing, a social operation presupposes
the existence of two (or more) intelligent beings who are equipped with the
mental faculties that enable them to engage in the social act and the relevant
counterpart act as part of their constitution. When one of the intelligent be-
ings initiates the social operation and directs an act of expression to the other
intelligent being, the other being is ready to exercise the counterpart opera-
tion but voluntarily considers how to react. Although in ideal circumstances,
the reaction to a promise is the acceptance of the promise, acceptance of
promises is not an automatic response.23 Rather as an intelligent being,
one has a voluntary choice whether or not to accept a promise.24 Similarly,
when one person commands something, the other is not compelled to obey
the command, but rather is free to obey it or not.25 Or, when someone asks
a question, the addressee needs to use their intelligence to decide how to re-
spond. This means that the exercise of one social operation prompts the ex-
ercise of the counterpart operation, but the content of the reaction is not
determined. The important point is that the social operation, such as a
promise, does not come into existence until the other intelligent being who
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takes part in it has exercised the counterpart mental act, which in this case is
the mental act of accepting the promise, and made the response known to
the person who initiated the social operation.26
To turn to the second issue, althoughReid holds that every social act must
be expressed, because the act of expression is essential for communicating
the mental thoughts between the two parties that take part in the social op-
eration, it is worth noting that he acknowledges that expression can take a
variety of forms. His lectures and papers on Practical Ethics include reflec-
tions on contracts that speak to this point:
But it is to be observed that the Consent which is essential in all Contracts may be expressed
many different ways: either by a formal writing Signed sealed and delivered; or by the verbal dec-
laration of the several parties; or by the actions of the parties; or even sometimes by Silence, or by
their doing nothing, when it may reasonably be presumed that they would not be silent or inac-
tive if they did not consent. (Reid, 2007, XV, p. 136)
The important point is that both parties understand the meaning of the
signs that are used to express the content. Yet the signs do not have to be
expressed by artificial written or spoken words and could also be natural
signs such as bodily gestures, facial expressions, or modulations of voice.27
To further illustrate the claim that silence can in certain circumstances be
a form of expression, Reid gives the example of a parliamentary session,
where members of parliament have the option to speak up if they disagree
with a proposed motion. If they remain silent, their silence implies consent.
However, he makes clear that silence in other circumstances can mean noth-
ing. For instance, silently listening to a sermon at church does not reveal
whether the hearer affirms what is preached.28
Because the passage quoted here focuses on contracts, it is worth asking
whether Reid’s view that expression can take a variety of forms also extends
to other social operations. He distinguishes promises from contracts as
follows:
In a promise, one party only comes under the obligation, the other acquires a right to the
prestation promised. But we give the name of a contract to a transaction in which each party
comes under an obligation to the other, and each reciprocally acquires a right to what is prom-
ised by the other. (EAP, V.6, p. 328)
This suggests that in a contract both parties make a promise and both
parties have to accept the promise of the other party, while in a promise
one party makes a promise and the other party has to decide whether or
not to accept it. Because expression is not only an essential aspect of con-
tracts, but also of promises, and more generally of all social operations, we
can assume that Reid accepts further that the expression by words or signs
can take a variety of forms with regard to all social operations.
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The success of a social operation depends on the willingness of another
intelligent being to take part in it. Because intelligent beings can voluntar-
ily decide how they react to a proposed social operation, one may worry
that there is a risk that social cooperation is diminished or undermined
if intelligent beings refuse to participate too often. For instance, if prom-
ises are too rarely accepted, social interaction can fail; if reasonable com-
mands are not obeyed, the functioning of society can be at risk; or if
testimony is not believed, it can become difficult to acquire sufficient
knowledge. Indeed, Reid acknowledges these concerns and states that ‘if
men found in experience, that there was no fidelity on the other part in
making and in keeping [declarations and promises], no man of common
understanding would trust to them, and so they would become useless’
(EAP, V.6, p. 334). However, he is not too troubled by such worries, be-
cause he believes that God has made wise provisions to ensure that
humans not only commonly speak the truth and are truthful to their
promises, but also that they trust others to be truthful and to keep their
promises. He already acknowledges this point in his early work An Inquiry
into the Human Mind:
The wise and beneficent Author of Nature, who intended that we should be social creatures, and
that we should receive the greatest and most important part of our knowledge by the informa-
tion of others, hath, for these purposes, implanted in our natures two principles that tally with
each other.
The first of these principles is, a propensity to speak truth, and use the signs of language, so as to
convey real sentiments. This principle has a powerful operation, even in the greatest liars; for
where they lie once, they speak truth a hundred times. Truth is always uppermost, and is the nat-
ural issue of the mind. It requires no art or training, no inducement or temptation, but only that
we yield to a natural impulse. (IHM, VI.24, p. 193)
Another principle implanted in us by the Supreme Being, is a disposition to confide in the
veracity of others, and to believe what they tell us. This is the counter-part to the former;
and as that may be called the principle of veracity, we shall, for want of a more proper
name, call this the principle of credulity. It is unlimited in children, until they meet with in-
stances of deceit and falsehood: and it retains a very considerable strength through life.
(IHM, VI.24, p. 194)
He develops this view further in his Essays on the Active Powers of Man.
There he identifies fidelity (principle of veracity in IHM) and trust (principle
of credulity in IHM) as fundamental principles that make society possible:
Hence it appears, thirdly, That this power of giving testimony, and of promising, can answer no
end in society, unless there be a considerable degree, both of fidelity on the one part, and of trust
on the other. These two must stand or fall together, and one of them cannot possibly subsist
without the other.
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY8
© 2021 The Authors
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly published by University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Fourthly, It may be observed, that fidelity in declarations and promises, and its counter-part,
trust and reliance upon them, form a system of social intercourse, the most amiable, the most
useful, that can be amongmen.Without fidelity and trust, there can be no human society. There
never was a society, even of savages, nay even of robbers or pirates, in which there was not a
great degree of veracity and of fidelity among themselves.Without it manwould be themost dis-
social animal that GOD hasmade.His state would be in reality what HOBBES conceived the state of
nature to be, a state of war of every man against every man; nor could this war ever terminate in
peace. (EAP, V.6, p. 334)
From these observations, I think, it appears very evident, that as fidelity on one part, and trust
on the other, are essential to that intercourse of men, whichwe call human society; so the Author
of our nature has made wise provision for perpetuating them among men, in that degree that is
necessary to human society, in all the different periods of human life, and in all the stages of hu-
man improvement and degeneracy. (EAP, V.6, p. 335)
These two principles, namely, fidelity and trust, are an inherent part of our
human constitution and guarantee that we are naturally inclined to speak
the truth, be truthful, and to trust others. They can be said to provide a foun-
dation for the various other social operations such as promising and
accepting promises, testifying and testimonial belief, or commanding and
obeying. Because fidelity and trust are fundamental principles of our consti-
tution, they increase the willingness of intelligent beings to cooperate in so-
cial operations, provided that the proposed social operation does not
conflict with rationality and moral conscience.
To sum up, I amproposing that Reid offers the following account of social
operations:
(i) The performance of social operations necessarily requires the
existence of two (or more) intelligent beings who take part in the
operation. Let us call them A and B.
(ii) A social operation consists in A engaging in a mental act with a
particular content directed at B.
(iii) Themental act (e.g. the act of promising) does not come into existence
until A has expressed the proposed social activity to B by words or
signs (e.g. ‘I promise you to φ’) and B has understood it and expressed
their reaction to A by words or signs (e.g. ‘I accept the promise’).
(iv) WhenB reacts toA,B also engages in a social operation, which is the
counterpart operation to the operation thatA initiated, and exercises
a counterpart mental act (e.g. accepting promise), which is paired
with the mental act exercised by A.
3. Further clarifications
It is worth reflecting further on the consequences of the proposed reading. If
my reading is correct, it follows that a promise to oneself is not a promise,
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because promises are social operations and hence require the existence of an-
other intelligent being who takes part in it. Because a self-promise does not
involve another intelligent being, Reid has to accept that self-promises are
not promises. Although it is not uncommon to regard promises to oneself
as a special kind of promise, I take it that Reid would accept the conse-
quence and argue that promising and self-promising are different mental
acts. First, there are plausible philosophical reasons for distinguishing prom-
ises, which involve proper social interaction, from self-promises, because
self-promises are not binding in the same way as genuine promises are. If
promisor and promisee are identical, then the promisee can release the
promisor from fulfilling the promise.29 By contrast, if two distinct intelligent
beings engage in a promise, then the promisee’s acceptance of the promise
makes it binding and confers a right on the promisee.30 Second, there is tex-
tual evidence suggesting that Reid would argue that operations that we col-
loquially describe as a promise to oneself are better understood as a ‘fixed
purpose’ or ‘resolution’.31 For Reid, a fixed purpose or resolution is a volun-
tary operation of the mind that concerns ‘our future conduct’ (EAP, II.3, p.
65). He writes that ‘[t]his naturally takes place, when any action, or course of
action about which we have deliberated, is not immediately to be executed,
the occasion of acting being at some distance’ (EAP, II.3, p. 65). He further
notes that the purpose can be particular or general.32 It is particular if the ob-
ject of the resolution or fixed purpose is ‘an individual action, limited to one
time and place’ (EAP, II.3, p. 66). By contrast, it is general if its object con-
cerns ‘a course or train of action, intended for some general end, or regulated
by some general rule’ (EAP, II.3, p. 66). Reid holds further that a resolution
continues for as long as the subject wills it and ‘he may at any time change
his resolution’ (EAP, II.4, p. 70). Consequently, it is plausible to assume that
Reid would happily accept that self-promises are not promises and argue
that they are better understood as resolutions or fixed purposes.
By the same token, Reid would distinguish commands from self-
commands. With respect to commands, he holds that ‘the object of a com-
mand is some action of another person, over whom we claim authority’
(II.1, p. 49). He further notes ‘that a command is a social act of the mind.
It can have no existence but by a communication of thought to some intelli-
gent being; and therefore implies a belief that there is such a being, and that
we can communicate our thoughts to him’ (EAP, II.1, p. 50). By contrast,
when he speaks of ‘self-command’, he refers to a power of self-government,
which humans have, but non-human animals lack.33
I want to turn to another issue, namely, the question of what role the reac-
tion of the other intelligent being plays in social operations. Put differently,
the question is why condition (iii) is needed in addition to (ii) in the analysis
given at the end of Section 2. As we have seen earlier, Reid holds that it is
important that a promise is accepted by the other intelligent being.34 Indeed,
he claims that the act of acceptance is essential to ‘make[… the operation] a
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promise’ (EAP, V.6, p. 342). However, one may wonder whether condition
(iii) extends to all other social operations. For instance, let us consider the so-
cial operation of asking a question. Does the operation of asking a question
always require a response from the hearer of the question? Although one can
utter a question in the absence of any intelligent being, for Reid, such an act
of expression does not constitute a genuine question. To illustrate that at the
very least it is essential that the other intelligent being understands the ques-
tion, let us consider the following scenario. Assume that one intelligent being
only speaks Italian and the other intelligent being only speaks Japanese. Let
us assume further that the Italian speaker asks the Japanese speaker in
Italian ‘Che ore sono?’ and the Japanese speaker does not react at all,
because they do not understand the meaning of the utterance and do not
recognize that the Italian speaker is trying to initiate communication with
them. In this case, no social interaction has taken place.35 Although there
has been an act of expression, the social operation of asking a question does
not come into existence.
Next, onemaywonder why it is not enough that the other intelligent being
hears the question and understands it. Questions can take a variety of forms.
Some questions can be answered with a short ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, while
others have one-word answers, and others again answers of one or several
sentence(s). Some questions have one correct answer, while others can be an-
swered in multiple different ways. Reid’s view neither requires that the
hearer can always give the correct answer, if the question has one correct an-
swer, nor that the hearer gives a long response, if a full response would re-
quire a certain level of detail. For instance, if I ask a friend ‘What is the
capital of Switzerland?’ and my friend responds ‘I don’t know’, this will be
sufficient for saying that the friend has reacted and participated in the social
operation. Or, if I ask ‘Why are some people happier than others?’ and my
friend responds ‘I need to think more about it before I can give a proper re-
sponse’, this will constitute a response to the question even if it is not the re-
sponse that the person asking the question was hoping to receive. It is worth
noting that the response to a question does not have to be verbal. My friend
could have also signaled through facial expressions or bodily gestures that
she has understood the question, but does not know the correct answer or
needs time to think more about it. The important point is that the intelligent
being to whom the question is addressed signals willingness to engage with
the question and this requires more than simply hearing and understanding
the question.
I want to address another concern. One may find it surprising that A’s
mental act, say the act of promising, depends on other intelligent beings ex-
ternal to A’s mind. However, rather than regarding this as a weakness of
Reid’s position, it is a consequence of his distinction between social and sol-
itary acts of mind and his claim that social operations cannot be reduced to
solitary ones.36 There is clear textual evidence that for Reid social acts are
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distinct from other mental acts such as perceiving, hearing, remembering,
judging, reasoning, or imagining and not reducible to them:
To ask a question, is as simple an operation as to judge or to reason; yet it is neither judgement,
nor reasoning, nor simple apprehension, nor is it any composition of these. Testimony is neither
simple apprehension, nor judgement nor reasoning. The same may be said of a promise, or of a
contract. (EIP, I.8, p. 68)
If the mental act of promising depended solely onA’s mind, then it would
be a solitary act of mind and Reid’s distinction between social and solitary
acts of mind would collapse and become redundant. Social mental acts still
have a subject to which they belong. Themental act of promising isA’s men-
tal act, ifA initiates the promise, and the mental act of accepting the promise
isB’s mental act, but eachmental act is relational and depends on the partic-
ipation of the other intelligent being.
To further clarify Reid’s position, let us consider the following scenario:
Assume that intelligent being A intends to make a promise directed at an-
other intelligent being B. A may have already expressed the utterance ‘I
promise you to φ’ in a letter addressed to B. However, unbeknownst to A
the other personB has died in the meantime.WouldA’s utterance constitute
a promise in such a case? Because Reid believes that a social operation nec-
essarily requires that another person takes part in it, this is not a promise. In
this case, an intention to engage in a promise and an act of expression exist,
but these mental acts are different from the mental act of promising.
At this stage, it is helpful to distinguish the question of whether a promise
has been constituted from the question of how A should act in the interim
period until B accepts or rejects the promise or untilA receives the news that
B has passed away. In general, it will be prudent for A to act as if B has ac-
cepted the promise even if they do not yet know how B will react. Assume
that A makes the following utterance directed to B: ‘I promise you to keep
this information secret’. If A does not receive an immediate response from
B and shares the information while they are waiting for a response from
B, then A will risk that the trust that others have placed in them is
undermined.37 Thus, it makes sense for A after they have uttered a promise
to act as if B has accepted it. This is not because a promise has been consti-
tuted by the utterance – it is not constituted until B has accepted it andmade
this response known to A – but rather prudential considerations make it
plausible to act this way. Moreover, as we have already seen, Reid believes
that fidelity and trust are two fundamental principles of human nature and
they can be said to explain why A most likely acts as if B has accepted the
promise while A waits for a reaction from B.
A slightly different scenario concerns the possibility that the promisee dies
after having accepted the promise. In this case, Reid would argue that the
promisor is released from fulfilling the promise. The reason for this is that
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he acknowledges that each promise depends on a set of implicit external con-
ditions, which are prerequisites for engaging in promises and being bound by
them:
No man can be certain of the continuance of any of his powers of body or mind for a moment;
and, therefore, in every promise, there is a condition understood, to wit, if we live, if we retain
that health of body and soundness of mindwhich is necessary to the performance, and if nothing
happen, in the providence of GOD, which puts it out of our power. The rudest savages are taught
by nature to admit these conditions in all promises, whether they be expressed or not; and no
man is charged with breach of promise, when he fails through the failure of these conditions.
(EAP, I.2, p. 18)
This shows that there is no obligation to fulfill a promise if unforeseen ex-
ternal circumstances interfere with it.
4. Problems with Copenhaver’s interpretation
In a very recent paper, Rebecca Copenhaver suggests that social operations
are characterized by the following three necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions38:
(a) a belief that the operation is directed to a being that is intelligent;
(b) the being to which the operation is directed is in fact an intelligent
being; and
(c) the operation be expressed to the being whom one believes to be
intelligent, and who is an intelligent being.39
I agree that the aforementioned conditions are necessary but question that
they are jointly sufficient.40 If we compare her analysis with the analysis I
have given at the end of Section 2, one may notice that my analysis does
not include her condition (a). This condition can be added without altering
my interpretation. Indeed, I take it that it is already implicitly entailed by
condition (iii).
One problem with Copenhaver’s analysis is that in the absence of further
refinement it seems to include mental operations that can be directed to-
wards another intelligent being, but are not necessarily so. To illustrate this
point, consider two intelligent beingsA andB and let us assume thatA utters
the following directed to B: ‘I hope that you will win the lottery’. This utter-
ance is accompanied by the mental act of hoping. The example satisfies
Copenhaver’s three conditions: A believes that B is intelligent, B is an intel-
ligent being, andA expresses the operation, namely, their mental thought, to
B. However, hoping is not necessarily directed towards another intelligent
being and can be directed towards myself, say when I hope that I will win
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the lottery, or towards no intelligent being at all, for instance, when I hope
that it will be sunny tomorrow. We have clear textual evidence that Reid
would not classify hoping as a social operation, because it conflicts with
his view that social operations ‘necessarily imply social intercourse with
some other intelligent being who bears a part in them’ (EAP, V.6, p. 330).
Instead hoping belongs to the solitary operations for Reid.
This problem can probably be remedied. Indeed, Copenhaver cites the rel-
evant passage where Reid states that by social operations he ‘understand[s]
such operations as necessarily suppose an intercourse with some other intel-
ligent being’ (EIP, I.8, p. 68),41 but the modal operator ‘necessarily’ does not
appear in her analysis (a)–(c). The point is that it is not sufficient that the op-
eration is directed towards another intelligent being in a particular instance
but that the operation necessarily requires another intelligent being who
takes part in it. Although one could aim to revise the conditions Copenhaver
has identified to better accommodate this issue, I will not do so here, because
I believe that a deeper problem is that Copenhaver does not pay attention to
the counterpart structure of social operations.
Let us focus on promises for a moment and assume that A and B are two
intelligent beings, A believes that B is an intelligent being, and that A ex-
presses ‘I promise you to φ’ directed to B. Given Copenhaver’s view, I take
it that she would accept that a promise exists in this case. However, this is
not Reid’s view, and the promise does not come into existence until the other
person has accepted it. Let me illustrate this point, by turning to a scenario
that involves temporal delay. Let us assume that at time t1 Awrites a letter to
B and this letter includes the written expression ‘I promise you to φ’. Let us
assume further that B receives this letter a week later at time t2. A couple of
days later at time t3, B writes a letter in response, which states ‘I accept your
promise’. A receives this letter a week later at time t4. This example makes it
pressing to consider at what time the promise comes into existence.
Copenhaver’s interpretation is consistent with the view that it comes into ex-
istence at time t1. Although I am not aware of a passage where Reid directly
engages with such a case, we have already seen that there is textual evidence
that supports the view that a promise does not come into existence until the
other intelligent being has understood it and accepted it.42 For this reason, it
is plausible to argue that the promise does not come into existence until t3 or
t4. Because Reid regards a promise as ‘a social transaction between two
parties’ (EAP, V.6, p. 342), I take it that he would argue that the promise
does not come into existence until time t4, because it is not until then that
A knows that B has accepted the promise and knowing that B has accepted
it makes the promise binding for A and confers a right on B.43
Copenhaver does not acknowledge the counterpart structure of social op-
erations. She focuses on the presence of two intelligent beings and on one
party’s expression of the mental operation but fails to acknowledge that
the reaction of the other intelligent being is important additionally. This
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means that she neglects that the other intelligent being has to actively partic-
ipate in the social operation to make it a social operation.My interpretation
avoids the problems that arise for Copenhaver’s view and is thus better
suited to capture Reid’s position.
5. Advancing Yaffe’s interpretation
I now want to take a closer look at Gideon Yaffe’s understanding of social
operations. Yaffe ascribes the following view to Reid:
Reid seems to be offering the following definition of a social act: amental act is social if, and only
if, the act’s performance necessarily implies the existence of intelligent beings, other than the
agent of the act, exercising their intelligence. (Yaffe, 2007, p. 282)
Yaffe’s definition is consistent with the account of social operations that I
have given, but it is not as precise as the interpretation I proposed. In partic-
ular, Yaffe’s statement that other intelligent beings are ‘exercising their intel-
ligence’ is vague and lacks the level of precision that my view offers. Yaffe
and I agree that social operations presuppose the existence of two (or more)
intelligent beings who are exercising their intelligence. I am further aware
that Yaffe regards the above as a definition and believes that it implies that
a social act must be expressed.44 This is because if A’s performance of the
mental act implies that another intelligent being B exercises their intelli-
gence, then A must communicate with B through an act of expression.
Hence, Yaffe’s view can accommodate that A must express the planned so-
cial operation toB, but Yaffe’s view does not include that it is further impor-
tant that B expresses their reaction to A. Moreover, he does not make
explicit that the mental act that B exercises when B exercises their intelli-
gence is a counterpart to the mental act that A exercises. My interpretation
has the advantage that it more clearly acknowledges the counterpart struc-
ture of social operations and thereby offers a more precise understanding
of Reid’s account of social operations. This is relevant, because Reid be-
lieves that we have distinct faculties, which are part of our human constitu-
tion and some of these faculties enable us to engage in social operations.
6. Reid’s criticism of Hume and a possible Humean response
I want to end by assessing Reid’s criticism of Hume’s view that fidelity to
promises is an artificial virtue and by considering a possible response on
Hume’s behalf. Before I turn to the evaluation of Reid’s criticism, let me
briefly introduce Hume’s view. According to Hume, a virtue is a quality of
mind that generates feelings of approval when contemplated from an
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unbiased point of view.45 He maintains that there are artificial virtues in ad-
dition to natural virtues. Natural virtues such as loving one’s children are
part of our human constitution and neither education nor social conventions
are needed to bring them about. However, Hume argues that we are not al-
ways naturally inclined to act virtuously and that there are virtues, which he
calls ‘artificial’; these virtues are human inventions and based on the needs
and interests of society. He regards fidelity to promises as one of the artificial
virtues. To illustrate Hume’s thinking, suppose that you promise your part-
ner not to drink in the evening. Hume asks what explains why you are will-
ing to observe the promise. Assuming you are someone who enjoys a few
drinks, you are not someone who is naturally inclined to refrain from drink-
ing, but rather the reason why you are willing to make the promise may be
that you have to drive home and you are aware that drunk driving is danger-
ous and could lead to severe penalties. Examples such as this prompt Hume
to argue ‘that promises are human inventions, founded on the necessities
and interests of society’ (Treatise, 3.2.5.7; SBN 519).46
Reid’s account of promises and more generally his account of social oper-
ations is meant to provide an alternative to Hume’s position. Reid attacks
Hume’s view that fidelity to promises is an artificial virtue by accusing
Hume of failing to realize that there are social operations in addition to sol-
itary ones. Reid believes that by acknowledging that promising is a social
operation he can account for its naturalness. Let us now consider whether
his view offers a satisfying response to Hume.
Reid’s account of social operations is sophisticated; it draws on his analy-
sis of the human mind and his thesis that it is important not only to distin-
guish different contents or objects of mental operations but also to
distinguish the different constituents of mental operations, which include
mental acts in addition to the contents or objects. Reid’s theory of the hu-
man mind includes a multiplicity of different mental faculties, which pro-
duce distinct and simple mental acts such as perceiving, remembering,
imagining, reasoning, testifying, and promising, which are distinct from
each other and not reducible to mental acts produced by other faculties. Re-
alizing that social operations involve irreducible mental acts and that the rel-
evant mental faculty is an inherent part of human nature is at the core of
Reid’s view for why social operations are natural. This leads to the question
of whether Hume would be willing to accept Reid’s move.
Hume has limited resources to account for distinct mental faculties. He
appeals to different degrees of force and vivacity to explain the differences
between sense perception, memory, and imagination. Hume claims that
the contents of perception – which he calls impressions – are present in the
mind with full force or vivacity, while the contents of memory – namely,
ideas inHume’s sense – are less lively, andwhen ideas entirely lose their force
and vivacity, they are contents of the imagination.47 Reid finds this view un-
convincing and challenges it with the following example. He claims that a
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human head can touch a wall with different degrees of force: First, a head
can bump into a wall with strong force; second, it can strike the wall with
medium force; and, third, it can touch the wall gently. Reid’s point is that
it does not make sense to regard the first way of touching the wall as percep-
tion, the second as memory, and the third as imagination, as Hume would
have it.48 Moreover, Reid argues that Hume’s philosophical system lacks
the resources to properly differentiate between different types of mental
acts.49
Does the fact that Hume cannot easily accommodate Reid’s distinctions
between different mental faculties or types of mental acts mean that Reid
has already won the argument? Although Reid’s distinctions certainly help
overcome ambiguities in Hume’s (and Locke’s) philosophical works, it
would be too quick to dismiss Hume’s position solely on this ground. To bet-
ter assess whetherReid’s criticism ofHume’s account of promises is convinc-
ing and fair, I will now outline a possible response that Hume could offer.
When Hume argues that fidelity to promises is an artificial virtue, he fo-
cuses on the content of promises and is interested in understanding whatmo-
tivates a promisor to observe a promise with a certain content. This question
is particularly pressing in cases where the promisor has conflicting desires.
Reid, however, does not tackle this issue head on and instead shifts the focus
of the debate towards the mental act of promising and its accompanying act
of expression and argues that the mental faculty to engage in acts of prom-
ises is an inherent part of human nature and, thus, natural rather than arti-
ficial. Because Reid believes that intelligent beings can voluntarily decide
whether or not to engage in social operations and can voluntarily decide
how they exercise the counterpart operations, Reid owes Hume a better re-
sponse to his question. For instance, consider an example where one intelli-
gent being A faces a choice between two possible promises. One option is to
promise their mother B to eat cake; the other option is to promise her not to
eat cake. In cases such as these, context can be relevant. For instance, it is
possible that A would much prefer to do other things than join the family
to eat cake. Or another possibility is that A is on a diet and for this reason
should not eat cake. In either scenario, the question is pressing whyA is will-
ing to make and keep the promise in question, because A could have also
promised the opposite or made no promise at all. Reid argues that it is nat-
ural for humans to engage in the act of promising, but he has not said
enough to explain what, for instance, motivates one to promise to φ – rather
than to promise not to φ or not to promise something at all – and to keep this
promise.
Reid not only claims that our faculty to engage in promises is natural, but
he further argues that God has equipped all humans with two fundamental
principles, namely, fidelity and trust, which are inherent parts of our human
constitution. Assuming that these principles are constituent parts of human
nature, Reid argues that humans are naturally inclined to keep their
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promises. Yet this response also remains silent onHume’s concern regarding
the content of promises. Especially, why would someone make and keep a
promise if its content conflicts with one’s desires? AlthoughReid does not en-
gage with this concern in depth, he may be less worried about it than Hume,
becauseReid believes that asmoral agents humanswill be guided by rational
principles andmoral conscience. If the content of a promise conflicts with ra-
tional principles ormoral conscience, then there is good reason not tomake it
or not to accept it. Overall, Reid just ismore optimistic thanHume about the
willingness of human beings to engage in social operations. ForReid, this in-
volves that humans remain truthful to promises and trust others.50
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NOTES
1 Reid discusses social operations in Reid (2002 [1785], I.8, pp. 68–70), hereafter cited as
‘EIP’ in the text, followed by essay, chapter, and page numbers; and Reid (2010 [1788], V.6,
pp. 327–344), hereafter cited as ‘EAP’ in the text, followed by essay, chapter, and page numbers.
2 For instance, he writes that ‘[t]he Author of our being intended us to be social beings, and
has, for that end, given us social intellectual powers, as well as social affections’ (EIP, I.8, p. 69).
See also Reid, EIP, I.5, p. 57, I.8, p. 69; EAP, III.ii.3–4, pp. 106–213, III.iii.3, pp. 163–164, V.6,
p. 334; Reid (2005, pp. 15–16, 48, 74–75).
3 Existing interpretations include Árdal (1984), Coady (1992, 2004), Copenhaver (2021),
Schuhmann and Smith (1990), and Yaffe (2007). See also Haakonssen (2007, pp. lxiii–lxv).
4 See Reid, EAP, V.5–6, pp. 301–344. Hume argues for the view that fidelity to promises is
an artificial virtue in his A Treatise of Human Nature, 3.2.5. References are to Hume (2007
[1739–40]), hereafter cited as ‘Treatise’ in the text, followed by book, part, section, and para-
graph numbers. Additionally, references will be given to Hume (1978 [1739–40]), cited as
‘SBN’ in the text, followed by page numbers.
5 See Reid, EIP, I.1, p. 26. Reid uses the expressions ‘mental act’ and ‘mental operation’ in-
terchangeably in various places and sometimes uses them in the narrow sense and sometimes in
the broader sense, which includes the object and subject and not just themental activity. For rea-
sons of clarity, I will use ‘mental act’ to refer to mental activities such as perceiving, remember-
ing, reasoning, or promising, and ‘mental operation’ to include not merely the mental activity
but also the object and subject.
6 See Reid, EIP, I.1, pp. 22–23.
7 See Reid, EIP, I.1, pp. 22–23.
8 See Reid, EIP, I.1, p. 22.
9 See Reid, EIP, I.1, p. 22.
10 See Reid, EAP, V.6, pp. 330, 342–343.
11 See Árdal (1984, pp. 62–63), Schuhmann and Smith (1990), and Coady (1992,
pp. 54–56; 2004).
12 For instance, in EIP, I.8, p. 68, Reid calls them ‘acts of the mind’; in EAP, V.6, p. 330, he
is explicit that social operations are ‘operations of the human mind’ like solitary operations.
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Coady (2004, p. 190), who ascribes a speech act interpretation to Reid, acknowledges this
problem.
13 On this point, I am in agreement with Yaffe (2007, p. 283).
14 I agree with Coady (2004) that a subject can take different mental attitudes to the same
content, or object as Reid would say. Coady argues that ‘[t]he crucial problem for Reid is that
many of the social operations clearly require the pronouncement of propositions, and so, on
Reid’s own account, belong with the solitary operations, since this pronouncement is an affirma-
tion or denial expressing judgment. This seems to land Reid in contradiction. His awkward po-
sition results from not noticing, or refusing to admit, that making a judgment can serve a solitary
or a social purpose’ (Coady, 2004, p. 198).However, I believe that the problem that Coady raises
vanishes once we realize that the content of mental operations does not make social operations
social, but rather the mental act accompanied by the act of expression and their counterpart acts
play an important role in making an operation social.
15 Yaffe (2007, p. 282) makes a similar point.
16 On this point, I agree with Yaffe (2007, pp. 282–283).
17 Although the question whether computers can be said to be intelligent is not settled in
present-day philosophy of mind, Reid would not ascribe intelligence to computers. One reason
for this is that he would argue that computers cannot be said to have minds, because they lack
active powers. For Reid, all minds are immaterial substances and only immaterial substances
can have active powers. Reid rejects materialist views of the mind such as Joseph Priestley’s po-
sition in his manuscript writings and builds on Samuel Clarke’s philosophy to defend an imma-
terialist view of the mind. See Reid (1995, part 3).
18 Reid argues for the claim that social operations presuppose active power in EAP, I.2, p.
18.
19 For instance, VanCleve (2006) in his discussion of Reid’s account of testimony focuses on
the contents of testimony and testimonial beliefs. Van Cleve asks whether beliefs based on testi-
mony are epistemically basic and argues that Hume’s reductionist view is philosophically more
plausible than Reid’s non-reductionism or foundationalism. I believe that Reid makes first and
foremost a claim about the irreducibility of the mental act of testifying, rather than the epistemi-
cally basic nature of the contents of testimony. By not engaging with Reid’s distinction between
the content/object of testimony and the mental act of testifying and its accompanying act of ex-
pression, Van Cleve does not fully appreciate Reid’s position.
20 In EAP IV.7, Reid writes: ‘I may command my horse to eat when he hungers, and drink
when he thirsts. He does so; but his doing it is no moral obedience. He does not understand my
command, and therefore can have no will to obey it. He has not the conception of moral obliga-
tion, and therefore cannot act from the conviction of it. In eating and drinking he is moved by his
own appetite only, and not by my authority’ (p. 236). See also, Reid, EAP, IV.5, pp. 221–222.
21 Reid explains in EIP I.1 that he understands the term ‘faculty’ as follows: ‘I apprehend
that the word faculty is most properly applied to those powers of the mind which are original
and natural, and which make a part of the constitution of the mind. There are other powers
which are acquired by use, exercise or study, which are not called faculties, but habits. There
must be something in the constitution of the mind necessary to our being able to acquire habits,
and this is commonly called capacity’ (p. 21).
22 See Reid, EIP, I.7, p. 68. See also Reid, EAP, V.6, pp. 330–333.
23 Reid discusses the voluntary aspect of social transactions in the context of reflections on
contracts. See Reid, EAP, V.6, p. 336.
24 For Reid, social operations presuppose active powers. See Reid, EAP, I.2, p. 18. For help-
ful further discussion, see Yaffe (2004).
25 See Reid, EAP, I.2, pp. 17–18, II.1, p. 49, IV.5, pp. 221–223, IV.6, p. 233, IV.7, p. 236.
26 See Reid, EAP, V.6, pp. 342–343.
27 Reid divides signs into two kinds, namely, natural and artificial signs. See Reid (1997
[1764], IV.2, pp. 50–53, V.3, pp. 58–61), hereafter abbreviated as ‘IHM’ in the text, followed
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by chapter, section, and page numbers. For Reid, signs and the things they signify have to stand
in ‘a real connection’ (IHM, VI.21, p. 177) to each other, but the relation between them is not
one of metaphysical necessary connection nor does it require resemblance between the sign
and the thing signified and is best interpreted as regular correlation. Artificial signs are conven-
tional and ‘have no meaning, but what is affixed to them by compact or agreement among those
who use them’ (IHM, IV.2, p. 51). For instance, the Englishword ‘lemon’ is an artificial sign that
signifies lemons, but it had no meaning until it was agreed that this expression is to be used to
refer to lemons. By contrast, natural signs do not require conventions or agreements and ‘have
a meaning which everyone understands by the principles of his nature’ (IHM, IV.2, p. 51). Reid
distinguishes three classes of natural signs. The first class ‘comprehends those whose connection
with the thing signified is established by nature, but discovered only by experience’ (IHM,V.3, p.
59). Examples of such natural signs include smoke as a sign of fire (see IHM, VI.21, p. 177). The
second class concerns ‘that wherein the connection between the sign and the thing signified, is
not only established by nature, but discovered to us by a natural principle, without reasoning
or experience’ (IHM, V.3, p. 60). This class includes bodily gestures, modulation of voice, and
facial expressions such as a smile as a sign for happiness. The ‘third class of natural signs
comprehends those which, though we never before had any notion or conception of the things
signified, do suggest it, or conjure it up, as it were, by a natural kind of magic, and at once
give us a conception, and create a belief in it’ (IHM, V.3, p. 60). Reid is here thinking about
examples such as sensations as a sign of ‘a sentient being or mind to which they belong’
(IHM, V.3, p. 60), or sensations hardness as signs of a real external quality of hardness (see
IHM, V.3–4, pp. 60–62). For helpful further discussion, see Powell (2017).
28 See Reid (2007, XV, p. 136).
29 I thank Lewis Powell for helping me clarify my views on these issues.
30 See Reid, EAP, V.6, p. 336.
31 See Reid, EAP, II.3, pp. 65–69.
32 See Reid, EAP, II.3, p. 66.
33 See Reid, EAP, III.ii.1, p. 98, III.ii.2, pp. 102–104, IV.4, pp. 218–219, IV.6, pp. 233–234.
See also Reid (2005, pp. 85–86).
34 See Reid, EAP, V.6, pp. 336, 342.
35 There are other variations of the scenario. For instance, the Japanese speaker may notice
that the Italian speaker is trying to start communication, and the Japanese speaker reacts by
using bodily gestures or facial expressions to signal that they do not understand the Italian
speaker. These cases are different from the scenario described in the main text. If there is com-
munication through natural signs, the case can be said to satisfy Reid’s criteria for a social
operation.
36 See Reid, EIP, I.8, p. 68; EAP, V.6, pp. 331, 333. On this point, I am in agreement with
Yaffe (2007, pp. 283–288).
37 See Reid, EAP, V.6, pp. 334–336.
38 See Copenhaver (2021, pp. 214–215).
39 I have slightly altered Copenhaver’s phrasing to ensure terminological precision through-
out my paper. Copenhaver speaks of an ‘object’ to which the operation is directed, while I have
replaced ‘object’ with ‘being’, because Reid uses the term ‘object’ as a technical term to refer to
the content of a mental operations and the distinction between the mental act and the
content/object of mental operation plays a central role in my interpretation.
40 There is good textual evidence for each of the conditions. Regarding (a), see Reid, EIP,
I.8, p. 69; EAP, II.1, p. 50. Regarding (b), see Reid, EIP, I.8, p. 68; EAP, V.6, p. 330. Regarding
(c), see Reid EAP, V.6, p. 330.
41 Copenhaver (2021, p. 214) quotes a longer excerpt of this passage.
42 See Reid, EAP, V.6, pp. 336, 342. The relevant passages are cited in Section 2.
43 See Reid, EAP, V.6, p. 336.
44 See Yaffe (2007, p. 283).
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45 See Hume, Treatise, 3.1.2.3–4, 3.3.1.3–4, 3.3.1.15–17, SBN pp. 471–472, 574–575,
581–583.
46 Hume offers detailed arguments for the artificiality of fidelity to promises in Treatise
3.2.5.2–6 (SBN pp. 516–519). For further discussion, see Cohon (2008).
47 See Hume, Treatise, 1.1.3; SBN pp. 8–10.
48 See Reid, EIP, III.7, p. 289.
49 See Reid, IHM, I.6, p. 22; EIP, III.7, pp. 287–289. For instance, Reid holds in EIP, III.7,
pp. 287–288, that Hume’s explanation of memory presupposes memory in a sense that Hume
within his own system cannot account for. If one accepts that an original perception ofX is more
vivid than amemory ofX, then in order to identify the latter as amemory state onemust remem-
ber the original perception and, so Reid argues, Hume lacks the resources to account for this
kind of memory that his understanding of memory presupposes. For helpful further discussion,
see Van Cleve (2015, pp. 244–248).
50 I presented earlier versions of this paper at the Themes from the History of Philosophy
Workshop at Trinity College Dublin in December 2017, the Socialising Minds Workshop at
the Royal Netherlands Institute in Rome in February 2018, the Berlin-Hamburg Workshop in
Early Modern Philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin in June 2018, the Philosophy
ColloquiumatTrinityCollegeDublin inOctober 2018, the Institute for the Study of Scottish Phi-
losophy Conference in Lausanne in March 2019, the APA Pacific Division Meeting in Vancou-
ver in April 2019, the British Society for the History of Philosophy Conference at King’s College
London in April 2019, the PhilosophyWorks-in-Progress Seminar at University College Dublin
inMay 2020, and the Virtual EarlyModern PhilosophyWorkshop inMay 2020. I received very
helpful feedback from the audiencemembers at these events for which I am enormously grateful.
I especially like to thank Colin Chamberlain, Patrick Connolly, M. Folescu, Ann Levey, Kenny
Pearce, and Lewis Powell for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank
two anonymous referees for this journal for their helpful and constructive comments.
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